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Electrophysiology-based concealed information tests (CIT) try to determine whether
somebody possesses concealed information about a crime-related item (probe) by
comparing event-related potentials (ERPs) between this item and comparison items
(irrelevants). Although the broader field is sometimes referred to as “memory detection,”
little attention has been paid to the precise type of underlying memory involved. This
study begins addressing this issue by examining the key distinction between semantic and
episodic memory in the autobiographical domain within a CIT paradigm. This study also
addresses the issue of whether multiple repetitions of the items over the course of the
session habituate the brain responses. Participants were tested in a 3-stimulus CIT with
semantic autobiographical probes (their own date of birth) and episodic autobiographical
probes (a secret date learned just before the study). Results dissociated these two
memory conditions on several ERP components. Semantic probes elicited a smaller
frontal N2 than episodic probes, consistent with the idea that the frontal N2 decreases
with greater pre-existing knowledge about the item. Likewise, semantic probes elicited
a smaller central N400 than episodic probes. Semantic probes also elicited a larger P3b
than episodic probes because of their richer meaning. In contrast, episodic probes elicited
a larger late positive complex (LPC) than semantic probes, because of the recent episodic
memory associated with them. All these ERPs showed a difference between probes and
irrelevants in both memory conditions, except for the N400, which showed a difference
only in the semantic condition. Finally, although repetition affected the ERPs, it did not
reduce the difference between probes and irrelevants. These findings show that the type
of memory associated with a probe has both theoretical and practical importance for CIT
research.
Keywords: concealed information, deception, deception detection, ERPs (event-related potentials), semantic
memory, episodic memory
INTRODUCTION
The logic of concealed information tests (CIT) is that stimuli that
are known or familiar to people should elicit a different response
relative to comparable stimuli that are new (Lykken, 1959).
Such tests could have various forensic applications, for example,
to determine whether a person who denies having informa-
tion about certain crime details or certain sensitive information
actually possesses such information. CITs have been studied for
many decades using several dependent variables, including long-
standing, peripheral psychophysiological measures (Ben-Shakhar
and Elaad, 2003) and, more recently, electrophysiological (event-
related potential, ERP) (Rosenfeld et al., 1988, 1991, 2008; Farwell
and Donchin, 1991; Allen et al., 1992) and hemodynamic ones
(functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) (Langleben et al.,
2002; Phan et al., 2005; Christ et al., 2009; Nose et al., 2009; Ganis
et al., 2011).
ERP-based CITs have garnered increased attention lately due
to several advantages (e.g., Rosenfeld et al., 2008). (1) They
have shown high accuracy rates reliably in detecting concealed
information in mock crime scenario paradigms, at least in the
laboratory conditions tested. (2) They are relatively inexpensive
to implement. (3) The data can be acquired relatively quickly by
using a few recording sites on the head. However, the underlying
neural mechanisms are largely undetermined. A critical, under-
studied issue in the field is that people can learn and remember
information about an event in many ways.
For example, memory theories distinguish between semantic
and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972), and different brain sys-
tems have been implicated in each. Episodic memory depends
on mediotemporal lobe structures, especially the hippocampus,
whereas semantic memory does so much less, if at all, and
depends on association cortex, such as anterior temporal cortex
(Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Schmolck et al., 2002; Eichenbaum
et al., 2007; Patterson et al., 2007; Bayley et al., 2008). That
different brain systems support episodic and semantic memory
raises the important issue that the brain signatures should differ
when concealed information revealed on a CIT relies to different
degrees on episodic vs. semantic memory. For example, evidence
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from developmental amnesia patients, who have hippocampal
damage and impaired episodic but spared semantic memory,
suggests that even residual hippocampal function (despite 50%
volume loss or more) is necessary and sufficient to support rela-
tive sparing of the ability to imagine false events (Maguire et al.,
2010), which is a necessary episodic memory ability for effec-
tive deception; neural signatures of such hippocampal activity
would thus be expected to be greater for a CIT based on episodic
memory relative to one based on semantic memory.
Indeed, the episodic-semantic distinction extends also to the
kind of autobiographical memory typically tested in CITs (e.g.,
Martinelli et al., 2012), the focus of this paper. There are episodic
and semantic forms of autobiographical memory. An episodic
memory encompasses concrete and unique details associated with
distinct events that were experienced by a person in a specific
spatiotemporal context and, critically, becomes an episodic auto-
biographical memory (EAM) when this memory also refers to
the self in relation to that context (Tulving, 2002). For example,
details about a specific experience that happened at a certain time
and place that caught one by surprise. In contrast, semantic auto-
biographical memory (SAM) encompasses personal information,
including general knowledge of personal facts not associated with
a specific time and place of acquisition (e.g., “my name is Pat” or
“my birthday is December 5th”) and non-specific events, includ-
ing both repeated and extended events (e.g., schema and script
knowledge about “birthdays” not associated with any specific
time and place, such as that birthdays are fun and involve friends
and family) (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Studies in neurological
patients confirm this distinction. For example, amnesic patient
K.C. (Tulving, 1993) could report semantic knowledge, such as his
own date of birth, but not any autobiographical episodic informa-
tion (e.g., autobiographical details about any specific birthday).
An important question is whether autobiographical probes asso-
ciated with high semantic vs. episodicmemory are associated with
different neural processes in the context of a CIT, as would be pre-
dicted by neurocognitive studies of these two types of memories
(e.g., Tulving et al., 1988; Martinelli et al., 2012). This question
also has applied relevance because it could provide information
about the brain signatures of these different types of memories
that can inform how to maximize detecting concealed informa-
tion in specific cases. It is important to note that, although there
may be distinct neural systems supporting EAM and SAM (e.g.,
Martinelli et al., 2012), most information in real life is often asso-
ciated with both EAM and SAM, though with different relative
strengths. Note that, for simplicity, in the rest of the paper we will
often omit the attribute “autobiographical” and refer simply to
semantic and episodic memory.
The main previous ERP study that addressed a related ques-
tion with an explicitly applied focus is one by Rosenfeld et al.
(2006). “High-impact” and “low-impact” probes were compared
that differed in semantic and episodicmemory content. The high-
impact probe was the participant’s name, whereas the low-impact
probe was the experimenter’s name (i.e., “JULIE”). The ERP dif-
ferences between high-impact probes and a set of random control
names (referred to as “irrelevants” in the CIT literature) were
much larger than those between the low-impact probes and the
irrelevants (i.e., the CIT effect was larger for high than low-impact
probes). However, important issues about this finding need to
be resolved. First, the same low-impact probe was used for all
participants (i.e., the experimenter’s name was always “JULIE”).
This raises the concern that there could be something intrinsi-
cally special, and consistently so across participants, about this
name (e.g., frequency, length, associations). This confound was
not present for the high-impact probes, as they varied across par-
ticipants. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the female name
used for everybody in the low-impact condition might have been
processed differently by male and female participants (i.e., Julie
is a female name), as well as individuals (i.e., different peo-
ple named Julie that each one knows), increasing variability in
the results. The ERPs were also recorded from only three sites,
limiting assessment of spatial distribution differences between
conditions. Finally, the study examined only the P3, leaving it
open what effects other ERPs might show, such as the centropari-
etal N400 marker of semantic memory (Kutas and Federmeier,
2011) or the parietal late positive complex (LPC) associated with
episodic recollection (Rugg and Curran, 2007). We would argue
that the better way to describe the high- and low-impact probes
is in terms of how they activate different kinds of memory. For
example, both probes activate semantic and episodicmemory, but
in different ways for the participant’s name (“high-impact”) and
the experimenter’s name (“low-impact”). Specifically, the partici-
pant’s name could activate semantic memory more automatically
than episodic memory, on average, because people are over-
learned experts at responding to their own name, whereas most
episodic memories associated with their name would be remote
and many would be highly similar and so not distinctly mem-
orable, such as people calling their name, potentially resulting
in a lot of interference for recalling associated episodic mem-
ories and making them effortful to activate (Soderlund et al.,
2012). Thus, semantic memory would be exceptionally auto-
matic for the participant’s name, consistent with evidence for
a large auditory N400 for one’s own name relative to other
proper names and no evidence for a posterior LPC effect, sug-
gesting little difference in episodic memory for one’s own name
and other proper names (Muller and Kutas, 1996). However, by
telling subjects that the experimenter’s name is “Julie,” subjects
acquire a recent episodic memory, which is less effortful to acti-
vate than the more remote memories associated with one’s own
name (Soderlund et al., 2012), predicting a larger LPC for the
experimenter’s than participant’s name, but this has not yet been
examined to date. In summary, we would suggest that in the study
by Rosenfeld et al. (2006), the participant’s name would predom-
inantly activate SAM, whereas the experimenter’s name would
predominantly activate recent EAM, but such ideas have not yet
been systematically addressed.
Thus, the first goal of the current study was to address the
question of concealed information based on different types of
memory more directly while getting around the limitations in
the previous work. First, comparable stimuli without a gender
component were used for the semantic (the participant’s date of
birth) and episodic (a “secret” date given to the participant just
before the study) autobiographical memory conditions. Second,
all probes and irrelevants varied by person, eliminating any sys-
tematic biases in the group average. Third, 32 recording sites
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were used, enabling potential scalp distribution differences in the
ERPs elicited by the two conditions to be determined. Fourth, and
related to the previous point, not only the P3 but also other ERPs
were evaluated, including the frontal N2, the N400, and the LPC.
A second important issue that has not been addressed system-
atically in the ERP literature is the effect of stimulus repetition.
Because of the relatively low signal-to-noise ratio achievable with
all behavioral and psychophysiological measures employed, the
typical CIT paradigm averages several tens of trials in which
probes and irrelevants repeat many times. Differences between
probes and irrelevants using psychophysiological measures, such
as skin conductance, decrease rapidly with stimulus repetition
because of habituation (e.g., Ben-Shakhar et al., 1975; Ben-
Shakhar and Elaad, 2002). However, the same effect may not
be present with ERP measures because they may tap into dif-
ferent mechanisms. Furthermore, potential differences between
semantic and episodic probes may change over the course of
the experimental session. For example, repeated presentation will
reactivate semantic and/or episodic memories associated with a
probe but do less so if at all for irrelevants, since no distinct
semantic or episodic information is available about them. This
could result in a difference between probes and irrelevants that
becomes larger over time, as ERP repetition effects can be greater
for meaningful than meaningless items (Schendan and Maher,
2009; Voss et al., 2010). Another possibility is that repetition of the
probes might alter the activation of the semantic and/or episodic
memory underlying each. For example, the episodic probe might
develop increasing associations with the experimental context,
resulting in development of semantic memory (Gratton et al.,
2009). This might reduce the N400 (which is smaller when
semantic memory activates more successfully) (Voss et al., 2010;
Voss and Federmeier, 2011), thereby reducing differences between
semantic and episodic probes. On the other hand, all stimuli,
including the semantic probe, might develop additional episodic
memories with each exposure in the experiment, resulting in
additional episodic memories that might increase the LPC (which
is larger for more episodic memory), thereby also reducing differ-
ences between semantic and episodic probes and associated CIT
effects.
The key idea in classical CIT theories is that probes will gener-
ate an orienting response associated with, for example, increased
skin conductance (e.g., Sokolov, 1963; Gati and Ben-Shakhar,
1990). Although these theories may be adequate to explain auto-
nomic nervous system findings, they cover only a subset of the
central nervous system processes engaged by a probe during the
CIT (relative to irrelevants) and implicitly assume that probes
activate only one kind of memory. However, in the framework
described here, semantic and episodic probes may be associated
with different neural processes.
Current theories of memory predict that semantic probes
would primarily activate semantic memories stored in the neo-
cortex and indexed by ERPs such as the N400 and P3b, whereas
episodic probes would primarily activate episodic memory stored
in mediotemporal and linked cortical structures, indexed by late
parietal potentials, such as the LPC (Paller and Kutas, 1992; Rugg
et al., 1998; Dien et al., 2004; Voss and Paller, 2006). In prac-
tice, most stimuli are associated with both semantic and episodic
memories, and so they would elicit some combination of these
effects. For the stimuli in this study, one’s date of birth is asso-
ciated with strong SAM, activating meaning-related processes
about oneself in semantic memory but also activating episodic
memories incidentally (e.g., events during a specific birthday
party, although this may be reduced by providing only the day and
month of each date). Prior to the experiment, the birth date is also
associated with relatively remote episodic memories of birthday
events and other experiences involving one’s birth date, such as
filling out applications (e.g., for jobs, insurance, taxes). In addi-
tion, as the birth date is repeatedly experienced over the course
of the experiment, each of these experiences may be encoded as
a new (1) episodic memory (Paller and Wagner, 2002) and/or
(2) constructed memory that combines new and old (i.e., due to
incidental recollection of various birth date memories) episodic
elements as well as semantic memory (Hassabis and Maguire,
2009).
New, recent episodic memory encoding can also occur for a
different date with no semantic or episodic memory associated
with it before the experiment, such as the secret date. Importantly,
while multiple trace theory proposes that the hippocampus sup-
ports all episodic memories, regardless of how long ago they were
encoded (Nadel et al., 2000), some evidence suggests that differ-
ent parts of the hippocampus support more recent vs. remote
episodic memory (Kesner and Hunsaker, 2010; Mankin et al.,
2012). Further, between 3 days and 3 months after the learning
episode, episodic memories may become semantic by increasing
connectivity between cortical areas while decreasing connectiv-
ity with the hippocampus (Harand et al., 2012), and a study
comparing episodic memories for events ranging in time from
very recent (3–14 days old) to very remote (10 years old) found
evidence that the hippocampus and the EAM cortical network
are integrated more strongly for recent than remote memories
(Soderlund et al., 2012). Consequently, more remote memories
requiremore strategic top-downprocesses in prefrontal cortex for
them to be retrieved than domore recent memories. This predicts
that ERP effects related to EAM will be greater for the secret date,
which involves very recent episodic memory, than the birth date,
which involves mostly much more remote episodic memory.
On the other hand, the secret date is minimally meaning-
ful (i.e., low in semantic memory) relative to the birth date.
Repeated experiences with any date could potentially begin to
construct new semantic memory about that date (Curran et al.,
2002; Gratton et al., 2009), but the ability to do so would be
minimal because little meaningful information is provided about
any dates within the experiment. Notably, the information that
the probe is a secret date to be kept concealed during the exper-
iment is meaningful and could lead to learning this as new
semantic memory due to repeated experiences with it; knowledge
and semantic memory typically require multiple experiences to
acquire (Glisky and Schacter, 1987; Verfaellie and Cermak, 1994).
Another important way that all these semantic and episodicmem-
ory processes could affect the CIT is by inducing standard oddball
effects thought to be related to ongoing contextual updating pro-
cesses in working memory (Kutas et al., 1977; Donchin and Coles,
1988; Dien et al., 2004; Polich, 2007). This could result in a larger
P3b to the probes than irrelevants. Further, the P3b to probe
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conditions could differ as a function of the relative combination
of associated semantic and episodic memory. In sum, the birth
date potentially activates a combination of high semantic mem-
ory and remote episodic memory for multiple birthdays related
events, whereas the secret date potentially activates a combination
of low semantic memory and recent episodic memory for a sin-
gle event. Despite reflecting a combination of memory influences,
the birthdate and secret date provide an interesting and impor-
tant starting point for assessing the role of semantic and episodic
memory in CITs.
The focus of this paper is on the frontal N2, N400, P3, and
LPC components. The frontal N2 is important because recent
studies suggest that concealed information in CITs modulate
this component with visual (Gamer and Berti, 2010) and audi-
tory stimuli (Matsuda et al., 2009), with probes eliciting a larger
frontal N2 than irrelevants. This would be predicted by orient-
ing reflex theory (Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2003), as the probe is
more meaningful than the irrelevants and occurs infrequently (it
is “novel” within the local stimulus sequence). If the frontal N2
reflects primarily an orienting reflex to meaningful information,
the N2 should be larger for (1) probes and targets than irrelevants,
and (2) semantic autobiographical information, such as one’s date
of birth, relative to recently acquired episodic information, such
as a random (secret) date seen just before the study. However,
the frontal N2 is known to be modulated by other variables as
well, including the extent to which a stimulus matches to memory
(e.g., Folstein and Van Petten, 2008; Folstein et al., 2008): the less
a stimulus matches memory, the larger the N2. The precise type
of memory involved is usually not specified, but knowledge (e.g.,
of an object category) and working memory have been mainly
studied so far. Thus, an alternative prediction can be made based
on the idea that match to knowledge is relevant for N2 mod-
ulation. The numbers and month abbreviations used as stimuli
will activate knowledge about numbers and months, respectively.
This predicts that the N2 will be larger to the irrelevants (mini-
malmemory: people haveminimal knowledge about the numbers
in random dates that have no task relevance) than a meaning-
ful item (e.g., birth date with rich semantic and remote episodic
memories). In addition, depending upon how much new mem-
ory is encoded for the episodic item (e.g., a “secret” probe date
will be associated with new episodic memory and possibly new
knowledge induced by repetition within the experimental con-
text), the N2 to this item may be in-between that to irrelevants
and the semantic item.
The centroparietal N400 is larger when an item activates
semantic memory less relative to more successfully (Kutas and
Federmeier, 2011). Although people know the numbers and
month abbreviations used to denote dates, an arbitrary date is
not very rich in meaning. In contrast, one’s birth date is per-
sonally meaningful because it is rich in SAM. This predicts that
the N400 will be larger for irrelevant dates than the semantic
item (birthdate). In addition, as with the frontal N2, depend-
ing upon the extent to which new semantic memory is encoded
for the episodic item, its N400 may be in-between that to irrel-
evants and the semantic item. However, the N2, which merely
requires new knowledge to be acquired, may be more sensitive
to the memory manipulations in this experiment than the N400,
which requires the more demanding encoding of a meaningful
representation. After all, the episodic manipulation can induce
new knowledge to be learned, but this new information is min-
imal in meaning, and meaningful representations would typically
require a stronger induction event than that used in this experi-
ment (Gratton et al., 2009). For example, acquisition of category
knowledge with minimal associated meaning modulates a fronto-
central N2 but not necessarily the N400 (Folstein et al., 2008).
The N400 may thus show little or no difference between irrel-
evants and episodic items, instead differing primarily between
irrelevants and semantic items.
The effect of concealed information on the P3 has been investi-
gated in numerous ERP studies (e.g., Rosenfeld et al., 1988; Allen
et al., 1992; Rosenfeld et al., 2004), but almost all used fewer
than five recording sites and so differences between the spatial
distribution of the P3 in the different conditions may have been
missed. Indeed, the P3 is a family of components, and what has
usually been referred to as P3 in previous studies is most likely
an instance of the P3b, which has been dissociated from the P3a
(Dien et al., 2004; Polich, 2007; Verleger, 2008). The P3b is known
to be modulated by many factors, including the subjective proba-
bility of items in a perceived category, the complexity of the task
and stimuli, and stimulus value (e.g., Johnson, 1986, 1993). We
predicted that the P3b to probes would be larger than to irrele-
vants, replicating previous findings (e.g., Rosenfeld et al., 2004).
Further, the semantic probes might elicit a larger P3b than the
episodic probes in part because they were the only items asso-
ciated with strong semantic memory and so they may stand out
more in the stream of irrelevants, which are associated only with
episodic information acquired during the study.
Finally, the LPC is typically larger during tasks that entail the
reactivation of episodic memories (Rugg and Curran, 2007) and
so we expected the LPC to be larger to probes, for which episodic
memories have been clearly associated, than to irrelevants, for
which episodic memory is minimal, and larger to probes in the
episodic than semantic condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Twenty-five naïve healthy volunteers (18 females, between 18 and
35 years of age, mean = 21, SD = 3.5 average age: z years),
recruited from the University of Plymouth (UoP), took part in for
course credit. Data from eight participants were excluded due to
excessive artifacts (7) or failure to carry out the task as instructed
(1). Participants had normal or corrected vision, and no history of
neurological or psychiatric disease. All procedures were approved
by the UoP Ethics Board.
STIMULI
The stimuli were dates in the format “day month” (e.g., 15 Apr,
Figure 1) commonly used by our European participants, sub-
tending about 3 × 2◦ of visual angle. Three types of dates were
used in each condition: irrelevants, probe, and target. During
the week preceding the study, at the same time detailed and
demographics and health questionnaires were administered, par-
ticipants were asked over the phone to provide their own date
of birth (only the day and month were required) and a list of
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the experimental paradigm. Participants
were tested in two memory conditions in separate blocks: semantic
autobiographical and episodic autobiographical. In both conditions, they saw
four irrelevant dates, randomly intermixed with a target date and a probe date.
In the semantic autobiographical condition, the probe was the participant’s
date of birth. In the episodic autobiographical condition, it was a secret date in
an envelope each participant opened just before the study. Participants
reported whether they possessed associated memories for any of the dates,
responding honestly to both the irrelevant dates (by pressing the “no” key)
and the target date (by pressing the “yes” key), but lying about their birth date
or secret date (by pressing the “no” key). Note: Item type labels in the figure
shown for illustration only and did not appear on the stimuli.
other important dates (dates of birth of close relatives and friends,
anniversaries and so on), so that a set of irrelevant dates could
be generated for each participant that excludes these personally
important dates. For the semantic autobiographical condition,
the probe was the birth date of each participant. For the episodic
autobiographical condition, the probe was a date that differed
from all other dates used in the study and was not on the par-
ticipant’s list of important dates. The irrelevant dates used for the
episodic and semantic conditions were always different. Irrelevant
dates never shared the day or the month of the probe or target
dates, and they were never famous dates. Furthermore, the target
never shared the day or month of the probe.
PROCEDURE
Before beginning the EEG setup, participants were shown a tar-
get date and then were unexpectedly taken into an adjacent
fire refuge area by an assistant and the experimenter and they
were given an envelope containing their “secret” date. Next, the
experimenter left the room, and participants were told by the
assistant to open the envelope and to memorize the secret date
contained in it, ensuring not to do anything that could reveal
they knew this date to the experimenter. Participants were also
told that this was their own secret date, different from every-
one else’s, and that they should keep the note it was written
on in their pocket or purse. After setting up the EEG cap and
electrodes, participants were seated on a comfortable chair in
front of a computer screen (about 114 cm away) in a dark room.
Two conditions were administered in separate blocks, the seman-
tic and episodic conditions, with order counterbalanced across
participants. In the semantic condition, the probe date was the
individual’s birth date whereas, in the episodic condition, it was
the “secret date.” This secret date varied by participant to match
the between-participant variability of the date of birth. In both
semantic and episodic conditions, participants were instructed
to deny possessing any memory for the probe date (birth date
or secret date, respectively) throughout the session by giving a
deceptive “no” response. They were also instructed to give an
honest “yes” response about knowing the target date. Thus, par-
ticipants had to report honestly whether they knew each date,
but they had to lie about the probe date. In sum, participants
responded honestly to both the target (pressing “yes”) and the
irrelevants (pressing “no”) but deceptively to the probe (press-
ing “no”). Participants responded by pressing one of two buttons
with the index and middle finger of their dominant hand. They
were instructed to respond as fast as possible without sacrificing
accuracy. Each item was presented for 800ms with an inter-trial
interval of 3000ms. In each condition, each item (four irrele-
vants, one probe, and one target) was presented 35 times in a
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pseudo-random order for a total of 210 trials. The constraints on
the pseudo-random sequence were that a probe and a target could
never appear in temporally adjacent trials, and any individual
irrelevant could only repeat for a maximum of three times in
the sequence. The same abstract sequence (i.e., the sequence of
irrelevant, probe and target types of items) was used for the
two conditions to eliminate potential differences due to sequence
statistics. Each condition was split into two blocks of∼7min each,
to test the effect of stimulus repetition. There was a short prac-
tice session (10 trials) before the experimental trials. Finally, at
the end of the study, participants were asked to recall the target
and the secret dates and indicate if they had any pre-experiment
memory associated with any of the other dates. Since there was
100% recall accuracy in all cases, the recall data were not further
analyzed.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL DATA ACQUISITION
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was sampled at 250Hz
from Ag/AgCl electrodes (gain = 20,000, bandpass filtering
= 0.01–100Hz). EEG data were collected from 32 electrodes
arranged in a geodesic array (Figure 3) and additional electrodes
placed below the right eye referenced to left mastoid to monitor
eye blinks, on the tip of the nose, and the right mastoid, all of
which were referenced to the left mastoid. Note that in this con-
figuration, Fz is just posterior to site 27, Cz coincides with site 28,
and Pz is just posterior to site 29. Horizontal eye movements were
monitored using two electrodes placed on the outer canthi of the
right and left eyes, referenced to each other. Electrode impedance
was below 5 k for all channels.
ANALYSES
Performancemeasures were submitted to ANOVAswith three fac-
tors: item type (average of irrelevants; probe; target), memory
condition (semantic and episodic), and repetition (first and sec-
ond half). To ensure participants carried out the task, follow-up
ANOVAs also contrasted targets with irrelevants and targets with
probes. However, the main comparison of interest for each mem-
ory condition was between probes and irrelevants because the
same response (“no”) was associated with both. As this compari-
son was the main focus of this experiment, and targets received
a different response (“yes”) from all other items, confounding
their comparison with other items, ERP analyses focus only on an
item factor that include probes and irrelevants; note, preliminary
analyses that included ERPs to the targets confirms expected tar-
get P3b effects. In the following, significant differences between
probes and irrelevants (in the behavioral or ERP data) will be
referred to as the CIT effect.
Response times
Response times (RTs) and accuracy rates were analyzed in the
omnibus ANOVA and planned comparisons.
ERPs
ERPs were averaged off-line for an epoch of 1000ms, including a
100ms baseline. Trials affected by blinks, eye movements, muscle
activity or amplifier blocking were rejected off-line. An average of
31 artifact-free trials per item type per participant went into the
analyses (MIN = 16, SD = 4.2). A One-Way ANOVA showed no
differences in the number of trials across conditions (including
both repetitions), F(5, 85) = 1.05, p > 0.1, η2 = 0.06. Data were
analyzed unfiltered but shown filtered at low-pass 30Hz in the
figures. Repeated measures ANOVAs on the mean amplitude of
the average ERPs assessed the effects of item type and condition
on the N2, N400, P3, and LPC components. The time win-
dows used for the main analyses centered arounds the mean peak
latency of the N2 (250–350ms), the N400 (350–500ms), the P3
(400–600ms), and the LPC (750–900ms). To assess the overall
pattern of results, a “lateral” ANOVA assessed lateral sites (13
pairs, see electrode montage in Figure 3) using factors of Item
Type (probes vs. irrelevants), Site, and Hemisphere. A second,
“midline” ANOVA assessed themidline sites (six electrodes) using
factors of Item Type and Site.
Planned focal analyses were also conducted at frontal sites
1 and 2 for the N2, central site 28 (Cz) for the N400, and parietal
site 30 for the P3b and LPC, where these components were max-
imal. These analyses compared (1) probes and irrelevants (i.e.,
the CIT effect) in both memory conditions, since we predicted
differences between probes and irrelevants in both cases, and
(2) probes between the two conditions, since we predicted dif-
ferences between the semantic and episodic probes. Note that we
did not carry out amplitude-latency analyses on the P3b because
the overlapping N400 made it difficult to determine P3b peak
latency in single participants. The focal analysis was carried out
on the mean amplitude data within the time windows used in the
main analyses. At focal sites, onset of the CIT effect (i.e., probes
vs. irrelevants) and the difference between semantic and episodic
probes was determined. For the N2 and N400, 25ms time win-
dows were used, between 100ms and 350ms, and 300 and 550ms,
respectively. A paired t-test between the conditions of interest was
carried out on each time window until a significant difference was
found in three successive time windows. The time window pre-
ceding the first significant time window was used as an estimate
of the onset time of the effect. For the P3, the same logic was used
with 25ms time windows between 200 and 600ms.
RESULTS
BEHAVIOR
Figure 2 shows the behavioral results. RTs varied by item type,
F(1, 16) = 54.09, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.77. Furthermore, RTs were
faster in the second than first half of each memory condition
block, F(1, 16) = 21.49, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.57, and this repeti-
tion effect was modulated by item type, F(2, 32) = 4.73, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.23. Follow-up analyses to parse this effect compared each
item type with the other two. RTs were slower to probes than irrel-
evants, F(1, 16) = 73.90, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.82, and both RTs were
faster in the second than first half, F(1, 16) = 25.32, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.61, but the repetition effect tended to be marginally larger
in the episodic than semantic condition, F(1, 16) = 3.68, p = 0.07,
η2 = 0.19. Similarly, RTs were also slower to targets than irrele-
vants, F(1, 16) = 85.84, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.84, and both RTs were
faster in the second than first half, F(1, 16) = 12.35, p < 0.005,
η2 = 0.44, but the repetition effect tended to be marginally larger
in the episodic than semantic condition, F(1, 16) = 3.22, p = 0.09,
η2 = 0.17. In contrast, RTs to targets and probes were similar, and
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results. Top, average response times (RTs) to
irrelevants, probes, and targets in the semantic (red bars) and episodic (gray
bars) autobiographical conditions during the first (light bars) and second
(dark bars) repetition. Bottom, accuracy for the same conditions. Error bars
depict 1 SEM.
both RTs were faster in the second than first half, F(1, 16) = 24.11,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.60, but probes were slower than targets in
the first half, whereas the opposite held in the second half,
F(1, 16) = 8.30, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.34. Accuracy showed only a
main effect of item type, F(1, 16) = 15.36, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.49.
Follow-up analyses revealed that accuracy was lower for tar-
gets than both irrelevants, F(1, 16) = 17.11, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.52,
and probes, F(1, 16) = 13.36, p < 0.005, η2 = 0.46. Accuracy was
also lower for probes than irrelevants, F(1, 16) = 11.67, p < 0.005,
η2 = 0.42. Notably, there were no significant main effects of
memory on RTs and accuracy and no significant repetition effects
on accuracy.
EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS (ERPs)
Qualitatively, the ERP waveform showed an occipitotemporal P1
and a corresponding anterior N1, followed by a frontocentral P2
and N2, and a centroparietal N400, P3b, and LPC (Figures 3–7).
Four main differences between items and memory conditions
are evident in the ERPs. The first difference is on the N2,
maximal at frontal sites between 250 and 350ms (Figures 3, 4
and 5A). Second, a clear N400 component overlapping the first
part of the P3b is present in the episodic condition, maximal
at central sites, and to a lesser extent in the semantic condition
(Figures 3 and 5B). The third difference is on the P3b, maximal at
centroparietal sites between 400 and 600ms (Figures 4 and 5C).
Fourth, LPC differences appear later at the same sites, lasting until
the end of the epoch (Figures 4 and 5C). Omnibus statistics are
shown in Tables 1–3 and described below.
N2 (250–350 ms) and N400 (350–500 ms)
N2. Omnibus results at lateral and midline sites (Table 1)
showed a larger N2 for irrelevants than probes at frontal and
frontocentral sites (I × S), and ERPs were more positive during
the second than the first half (R, lateral sites, 3.81 vs. 3.31μV,
respectively; midline sites, 5.55 vs. 4.79μV, respectively, Figures 6
and 7). At lateral sites, repetition effects were maximal at cen-
troparietal sites and larger over the right hemisphere at fronto-
central sites, but symmetric or larger over the left hemisphere at
more posterior sites (R × S × H).
Planned focal analyses on frontal pair 1 and 2 showed that
probes were more positive than irrelevants (4.35 vs. 2.10μV,
respectively), F(1, 16) = 40.01, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.71, and this
CIT effect tended to be larger on the right than the left (3.46
vs. 2.99μV, respectively), F(1, 16) = 4.01, p = 0.063, η2 = 0.20.
Importantly, this CIT effect was larger in the semantic than
episodic condition, F(1, 16) = 5.53, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.26, due to
the probes in the semantic condition being more positive than
those in the episodic condition (4.87 vs. 3.83μV, respectively),
F(1, 16) = 4.50, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.22. This result is the opposite of
the hypothesis that the N2 CIT effects reflect orienting to nov-
elty but consistent with the alternative hypothesis that the N2
is sensitive to match to knowledge. No repetition effects were
significant.
The onset of the CIT effect in the two memory conditions
was determined at right frontal site 2, where the differences were
largest. Results showed that the CIT effect onset between 200
and 225ms in the semantic probe condition, and slightly later,
between 225 and 250ms, in the episodic probe condition. A sec-
ond onset analysis showed that the onset of the difference between
probes in the two memory conditions was also between 225
and 250ms.
N400. The N400 is the only ERP component to show a CIT
effect only in the semantic condition. The N400 is smallest for
the semantic probe, relative to the episodic probe and all irrel-
evants, which are indistinguishable from each other (Figure 3).
Figure 4 (middle) shows an overall centroparietal scalp distri-
bution between 400 and 600ms due to the combination of the
central CIT effect on the earlier N400 and the parietal CIT effect
on the later P3b. Figure 5B shows the memory effect around
central sites where the N400 overlaps least with the frontal N2
and parietal P3b, illustrating that the N400 is more negative to
episodic than semantic probes and has a central maximum and
overall centroparietal scalp distribution, which is characteristic
of the N400 index of semantic memory (Kutas and Federmeier,
2011). The omnibus analyses on the N2 and P3b capture the early
and late part of the N400, so the focus was on planned focal
analyses.
A focal analysis on Cz (site 28) showed that probes were
less negative than irrelevants (7.29 vs. 5.16μV, respectively),
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FIGURE 3 | Grand average ERPs elicited by irrelevants (thin solid lines)
and probes (thick solid lines) in the semantic (black lines) and episodic
(red lines) autobiographical conditions. ERPs are plotted between-100 and
900ms (at all scalp recording sites). ERPs are shown negative up and
referenced to the average of the left and right mastoids. A diagram with the
location of the recording sites is shown on the bottom right.
F(1, 16) = 7.05, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.31, and this effect was larger in
the semantic than episodic condition (3.27 vs. 0.96μV, respec-
tively), F(1, 16) = 6.16, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.28. A follow-up analysis
showed that the difference between probes and irrelevants was
only significant in the semantic condition, t(16) > 2.35, p < 0.05,
for both repetitions. ERPs were more positive during the sec-
ond than first repetition, F(1, 16) = 4.58, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.22, but
this effect did not interact with any other factors. Finally, ERPs
were more positive during the semantic than episodic conditions,
F(1, 16) = 8.73, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.35.
Finally, an onset analysis of the CIT effect in both mem-
ory conditions was carried out at Cz. Results showed that the
CIT effect onset between 400 and 425ms in the semantic con-
ditions, whereas it onset between 475 and 500ms in the episodic
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FIGURE 4 | Topographic maps of the ERP difference between probes
and irrelevants for (top) the N2 (250–350ms), (middle) P3b
(400–600 ms), and (bottom) LPC (750–900ms) in the semantic (left
column) and episodic (right column) autobiographical conditions. An
N400 map is not shown because there was no CIT effect in the episodic
condition, and the P3b map for the semantic condition captures the N400
as a positive difference at Cz (28); thus, the centroparietal distribution in the
P3b time period of the semantic condition reflects the combination of the
overlapping central maximum of the N400 CIT effect and the parietal
maximum of the P3b CIT effect. Note, the voltage scale is not the same for
all topographic maps.
condition. A second onset analysis showed that the onset of the
difference between probes in the two memory conditions was
between 400 and 425ms.
P3b (400–600 ms)
Omnibus results (Table 2) showed a larger P3b for probes than
irrelevants at lateral (I, 6.84 vs. 4.30μV, respectively) and mid-
line sites. This CIT effect was maximal at lateral and midline
centroparietal sites (I × S), and lateral results showed that this
effect was larger on the right at frontocentral sites but on the
left at more posterior sites (I × S × H). Importantly, the differ-
ence between probes and irrelevants was larger in the semantic
than episodic condition at lateral and midline sites (M × I),
and this interaction was largest at centroparietal sites (lateral,
M × I × S). ERPs at this time tended to be more positive
during the second than the first half (R). At lateral sites, this
repetition effect was larger on the right at frontal and pos-
terior sites, but symmetrical at central sites, and maximal at
right centroparietal sites (R × S × H). The lateral repetition
effect was also modulated by item type, as it was larger for
probes than irrelevants (I × R × S × H), and by memory
type, as it was larger at centroparietal sites in the semantic
condition, but at fronto-central sites in the episodic condition
(M × R × S).
Planned focal analyses were conducted at parietal site 30
where the P3b was maximal. Consistent with the omnibus
analysis, the P3b was larger for probes than irrelevants,
F(1, 16) = 38.35, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.71 (10.77 vs. 7.15μV, respec-
tively). Importantly, this CIT effect was larger in the seman-
tic than episodic condition, F(1, 16) = 5.26, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.25
(4.80 vs. 2.45μV, respectively) because the P3b was more positive
for the semantic than episodic probes, F(1, 16) = 4.53, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.22 (11.84 vs. 9.7μV, respectively). There was a non-
significant trend for the P3b to be larger during the second than
the first half, F(1, 16) = 3.56, p = 0.08, η2 = 0.18, and the CIT
effect was numerically larger during the second than the first
half, but this interaction of item and repetition was also not sig-
nificant, F(1, 16) = 2.47, p = 0.14, η2 = 0.13 (4.11 vs. 3.14μV,
respectively). Thus, the CIT effect did not change significantly as
a function of repetition (if anything, it became slightly larger).
The onset of the CIT effect in the two memory conditions was
determined at parietal site 30 where the differences were largest.
Results showed that the CIT effect onset between 375 and 400ms
in the semantic probe condition, and, later, between 450 and
475ms in the episodic probe condition. The onset of the differ-
ence between the probes in the two memory conditions was also
analyzed, revealing an onset between 375 and 400ms.
LPC (750–900 ms)
Omnibus analyses (Table 3) showed that the LPC was more pos-
itive for probes than irrelevants at lateral (I, 3.77 vs. 2.29μV,
respectively) and midline sites, and these CIT effects were largest
at lateral and midline centroparietal sites (I × S). The lat-
eral ANOVA also revealed that the LPC was larger in the
second than first half, and more so over the right hemi-
sphere (R × H), and a significant four-way interaction indi-
cated that the CIT effect was further modulated by repetition
and hemisphere (I × R × S × H). In contrast, the mid-
line ANOVA also revealed that the CIT effect was larger in
the semantic than episodic condition at centroparietal sites
(M × I × S).
Planned focal analyses conducted at parietal site 30 where the
LPC was maximal confirmed that the LPC was more positive
for probes than irrelevants, F(1, 16) = 30.19, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.65
(3.79 vs. 0.64μV, respectively), and in the episodic than semantic
condition, F(1, 16) = 4.97, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.28 (2.70 vs. 1.72μV,
respectively). Follow-up analyses showed that probes in the
episodic condition elicited a larger LPC than probes in the
semantic condition F(1, 16) = 5.25, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.25 (4.67 vs.
2.91μV, respectively). No repetition effects were significant.
DISCUSSION
In summary, performance is consistent with previous CIT stud-
ies using the 3-stimulus paradigm with speeded responses in that
responses for probes and targets are slower and less accurate than
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FIGURE 5 | The left side of each panel shows the ERP time course
for episodic probes (thin orange line), semantic probes (thin black
line), and difference between episodic and semantic probes (thick
blue line). The right side of each panel shows a topographic map for
the difference wave shown on the left: (A) N2; (B) N400; (C) P3b
and LPC.
for irrelevants (e.g., Gamer et al., 2007; Gamer and Berti, 2010).
The present results also provide evidence for repetition priming,
as responses to all items are faster in the second than the first half
of each memory condition block, on average. ERPs showmultiple
effects. First, the frontal N2 is larger to irrelevants than both types
of probes, and the CIT effect on the N2 starts by 225ms in the
semantic condition but slightly later, by 250ms, in the episodic
condition. Second, semantic and episodic probes begin to be pro-
cessed differently by 250ms, and this early effect is maximal at
frontal sites, where the N2 is larger for episodic than semantic
probes. Third, the N400 shows a CIT effect only in the semantic
condition, as a central N400 is smaller for the semantic probe rel-
ative to the episodic probe and irrelevants, which resemble each
other. Fourth, probes generate a larger P3b than irrelevants, and
this CIT effect starts by 400ms and is larger for semantic than
episodic probes. Fifth, episodic probes generate a larger LPC than
semantic probes. Sixth, although ERPs became more positive in
the second half of the trials, the CIT effect on the P3b remains
similar. Next, we discuss these findings in turn.
PERFORMANCE
The behavioral results indicate that probes and targets are more
difficult to process than irrelevants. The typical explanation for
this finding is that both infrequent probes and targets stand out
in the stream of irrelevants but require different responses. This
creates a conflict that takes some time to resolve (Gamer et al.,
2007). Note that, since targets were the only items requiring a
“yes” response, the direct comparison between targets and irrel-
evant is not very informative. The pattern of behavioral effects
was the same for both memory conditions. This indicates that
the ERP differences between these conditions do not reflect RT
or accuracy differences, and suggests that the probes in these
two conditions were similar in terms of saliency. The overall
repetition effect on the RTs, but the lack of a repetition effect
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Table 1 | Results of the omnibus lateral (Lat) and midline (Mid)
ANOVAs for the N2 (probe vs. irrelevants, 250–350ms).
N2
Lat Mid
F p η2 F p η2
I 3.87 0.07 0.19 ◦ 1.68 0.21 0.09
I × S 14.14 0.00 0.47 *** 9.57 0.00 0.37 ***
I × S × H 1.47 0.19 0.08
R 6.42 0.02 0.29 * 8.78 0.01 0.35 **
R × S 1.84 0.16 0.10 2.62 0.07 0.14 ◦
R × S × H 2.16 0.03 0.12 *
I, Item; R, Repetition; S, Site; H, Hemisphere. < 0.1; p◦ * < 0.05; **p < 0.01;
***p < 0.001.
Table 2 | Results of the omnibus lateral (Lat) and midline (Mid)
ANOVAs for the P3b (probe vs. irrelevants, 400–600ms).
P3b
Lat Mid
F p η2 F p η2
M × S 1.39 0.25 0.08 6.33 0.02 0.28 *
I 15.17 0.00 0.49 *** 26.20 0.00 0.62 ***
I × S 6.64 0.00 0.29 ** 7.12 0.00 0.31 **
I × S × H 3.06 0.00 0.16 **
R 2.99 0.10 0.16 4.39 0.05 0.22 ◦
R × H 4.17 0.06 0.21 ◦
R × S × H 2.05 0.03 0.11 *
M × I 7.45 0.02 0.32 * 6.33 0.02 0.28 *
M × I × S 3.49 0.04 0.18 * 2.33 0.09 0.13
M × R × S 3.08 0.03 0.16 * 2.49 0.07 0.13
I × R × S × H 2.66 0.01 0.14 **
M, Memory; I, Item; R, Repetition; S, Site; H, Hemisphere. ; *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
on the difference between probes and irrelevants, indicates that
repetition had mostly a generic effect independent of item type.
FRONTAL N2 AND CENTROPARIETAL N400: KNOWLEDGE AND
SEMANTIC MEMORY
N2
At least two types of frontal N2 components have been distin-
guished, a cognitive control N2 and a memory (mis)match N2,
whose amplitude is modulated by different factors (Folstein and
Van Petten, 2008; Folstein et al., 2008). Concealed information
studies have focused on the cognitive control N2 and most used
an orienting reflex account. Clearly, the pattern of effects on the
frontal N2 found here is not consistent with a simple orienting
reflex explanation (Sokolov, 1963). The N2 is largest for the fre-
quent irrelevants which, according to an orienting reflex account,
should be the least salient stimuli and so should be associated
instead with the smallest N2.
Table 3 | Results of the omnibus lateral (Lat) and midline (Mid)
ANOVAs for the LPC (probe vs. irrelevants, 750–900ms).
LPC
Lat Mid
F p η2 F p η2
M × S 4.15 0.01 0.21 * 0.52 0.48 0.03
I 31.24 0.00 0.66 *** 29.80 0.00 0.65 ***
I × S 4.79 0.00 0.23 ** 9.09 0.00 0.36 ***
R × H 4.72 0.05 0.23 *
M × I × S 1.57 0.17 0.09 2.93 0.02 0.15 *
M × R × S × H 1.73 0.09 0.10 ◦
I × R × H 3.52 0.08 0.18 ◦
I × R × S × H 2.47 0.02 0.13 *
M, Memory; I, Item; R, Repetition; S, Site; H, Hemisphere. ; *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Most previous CIT studies using ERPs have focused exclusively
on the P3b component, making it difficult to compare our results
with those of the previous literature. More troublesome, the low-
pass filtering employed in some studies is so extreme (around
4Hz in some cases) that any effects on fast changing compo-
nents like the frontal N2 would be wiped out (Rosenfeld et al.,
2006). However, two recent CIT studies examined the effect of
the experimental manipulations on components of the N2-family
(Matsuda et al., 2009; Gamer and Berti, 2010). The study by
Matsuda and collaborators used a 2-stimulus paradigm (i.e., no
targets were present), auditory stimuli of an episodic nature (sin-
gle digits), long interstimulus intervals (22 s) to enable peripheral
psychophysiological recordings, and a common average reference
montage, making it difficult to compare the results with those of
the current study with visual stimuli, fast intertrial intervals, and
average mastoid reference. Their findings showed a slightly larger
central N2 for probes than irrelevants, which the authors suggest
is an N2b reflecting the redirection of attentional resources to
salient stimuli (Matsuda et al., 2009). The study by Gamer and
Berti (2010) is perhaps more comparable to the present study
since it employed visual stimuli, a 3-stimulus paradigm, and a
right mastoid reference. This study reported a larger frontal N2
to probes than irrelevants, and attributed such an effect to cog-
nitive control processes required for response monitoring. Such
an explanation would predict a larger frontal N2 for probes
than irrelevants in the current study as well, but the opposite
was found. It is possible that differences in the paradigms could
account for this discrepancy: The stimuli differed (playing cards
were used in that study compared to dates here), different inter-
stimulus intervals were used (8 s, on average in that study vs. 2 s
here), and stimuli were not counterbalanced across participants
in the earlier work, leaving open the possibility of item-specific
confounds. These differences in the paradigm clearly resulted in
ERP differences compared with standard CIT results as, for exam-
ple, there was no P3b effect. Furthermore, a subsequent CIT study
by the same group (Gamer and Berti, 2012) failed to find any N2
effects. Although further work is required to fully characterize the
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factors that affect the frontal N2 in CIT paradigms, the current
study shows that concealed information is not necessarily asso-
ciated with a larger frontal N2 in CIT paradigms and that the
literature is inconsistent.
The pattern of N2 effects suggests that the degree to which
an item matches memory, a factor known to modulate frontal
N2 amplitude (i.e., larger N2 for memory mismatch), is the key
factor modulating the N2 in this study. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the finding that the frontal N2 is smaller for the date
of birth, the item associated with the most semantic (and remote
episodic) memory, followed by the secret date, which is associ-
ated with recent episodic memory for the learning experience in
which the participant received the envelope with this date (and
perhaps some newly acquired semantic memory, e.g., the fact that
the date is a secret), and by the irrelevants, which have very little
associated semantic or episodic memory. Based on this finding
alone, we cannot rule out that this N2 effect reflects both seman-
tic and episodic memory, but prior evidence implicates semantic
memory more. The N2 memory match effect has primarily been
found when knowledge is manipulated, not in episodic memory
experiments. This knowledge is not necessarily semantic (mean-
ing) per se, because frontal effects, especially frontopolar ones
where the N2 ismaximumhere, are not always foundwith seman-
tic manipulations (Ganis and Kutas, 2003; Kutas and Federmeier,
2011). A visual knowledge interpretation is also indicated by evi-
dence that a frontal N3(00) complex from 200 to 500ms, which
includes the memory match N2 as an early component of this
waveform, is specific to processing visual images (Barrett and
Rugg, 1989, 1990; McPherson and Holcomb, 1999) and modu-
lated according to how successfully visual knowledge is activated
for a category decision (e.g., dog, cat, car) (Schendan and Kutas,
2002, 2003; Schendan and Maher, 2009). Finally, it is noteworthy
that ERPs in the N2 time window became more positive with rep-
etition, but the effect did not vary by item type. Such an increase
over multiple repetitions may reflect accumulation of knowledge
with each repetition, as in category learning, which can modulate
the frontal N2, the N400, and other ERPs (Curran et al., 2002;
Folstein and Van Petten, 2004; Folstein et al., 2008; Scott et al.,
2008; Gratton et al., 2009).
N400
This interpretation of the N2 is consistent with the modulation
of the N400 index of semantic memory, which is clearest at cen-
tral sites [see site Cz(28) in Figure 5B] where the N400 overlaps
least with the frontal N2 and the parietal P3b. The N400 is more
negative for episodic than semantic probes because the amplitude
of the N400 is inversely proportional to the amount of seman-
tic memory associated with both linguistic and non-linguistic
stimuli (e.g., Kutas and Federmeier, 2011): A secret random date
acquired just before the study has little or no semantic memory
associated with it, compared to one’s birth date, which is by far
the most meaningful stimulus. Consequently, meaning activates
most successfully for this semantic probe, and its N400 is small-
est. In contrast, the N400 is larger to the episodic probe (secret
date), but comparably as large to the irrelevants. The similarity
between the N400 to the episodic probe and the irrelevants is
consistent with the fact that the meanings of all these items are
minimal and about the same (i.e., just the meaning of the num-
bers and months but no other richly meaningful facts). This also
indicates that the new information about the secret date acquired
before the study did not result in a sufficiently meaningful rep-
resentation to affect the semantic memory processes underlying
the N400. Notably, in contrast, the secret date information did
result in new knowledge, such as visual knowledge, as demon-
strated by the smaller frontal N2 for the episodic probe relative to
the irrelevants. This is consistent with evidence that certain types
of newly acquired knowledge result in sensitivity of the frontal
N2 (and similar frontal negativities between 200 and 500ms,
e.g., frontal N3 complex, N300, N350, N390 components) to this
knowledge (Curran et al., 2002; Ganis and Kutas, 2003; Folstein
and Van Petten, 2004, 2008; Folstein et al., 2008; Schendan and
Maher, 2009), but additional more richly meaningful informa-
tion needs to be provided for the centroparietal N400 to become
sensitive to newly acquired facts about an item (Gratton et al.,
2009). Importantly for deception detection, this means that the
N400 shows a CIT effect for semantic autobiographical informa-
tion, and quite a robust one, but minimal to no CIT effect for
episodic autobiographical information.
Previous CIT studies have not reported N400 effects for sev-
eral reasons. First, the N400 effect is largest at Cz(28) but overlaps
to some extent the P3b spatiotemporally at this site and parietal
sites. A number of CIT studies have used only the three midline
sites Pz, Cz, and Fz, or reported data only for those sites (e.g.,
Rosenfeld et al., 1988, 2004, 2006; Gamer and Berti, 2010), and
so may have missed N400 effects or analyzed them as part of the
P3b effects. Second, as mentioned in the context of the frontal
N2, extreme low-pass filtering to enhance slow components like
the P3b might have spuriously reduced effects on faster-varying
components such as the N400 (e.g., Rosenfeld et al., 2006). A third
reason is suggested by the present finding of a CIT effect on the
N400 only in the semantic condition. Episodic stimuli do not
show a CIT effect because, in the present work and many pre-
vious studies, they do not have sufficiently rich semantic memory
representations to produce a CIT effect on the N400.
From a memory perspective, it is necessary to consider
the alternative that the frontal N2 and centroparietal N400
effects reflect instead episodic memory. Indeed, frontal negativ-
ity between 100 and 300ms (during the N2) does show memory
effects, being more negative for new than old items during recog-
nition tasks (Tsivilis et al., 2001), but the interpretation of such
repetition effects, and similar ones on the N400, is controversial
(Rugg and Curran, 2007) and, if anything, points to knowl-
edge, conceptual memory, and semantic memory (Paller et al.,
2007; Voss et al., 2010; Voss and Federmeier, 2011). These issues
have been discussed in detail in the debate about whether an
N400-like component, which sometimes appears to have a more
frontal (and so labeled “FN400”) than centroparietal distribu-
tion, reflects episodic familiarity or conceptual implicit memory
(due to activation of meaning representations) (Paller et al.,
2007; Rugg and Curran, 2007; Voss and Federmeier, 2011). While
this debate is beyond the scope of this paper, it is relevant to
consider whether the frontal N2 or N400 pattern might reflect
episodic familiarity. We suggest that familiarity can’t simply or
easily explain the N400. First, one might argue that the semantic
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probe (one’s birthday) has more lifetime familiarity than the
episodic probe (an arbitrary date with no other meaning) because
episodic memories set up prior to the EEG recording are numer-
ous (albeit more remote) for one’s birthday but only singular
(albeit more recent) for the episodic probe. These pre-existing
episodic memories for one’s birthday therefore reduce the N400
(or N2) for the semantic more than the episodic probe. Second,
both semantic and episodic probes are equally as familiar in terms
of exposure during EEG recording (i.e., repeated the same num-
ber of times), which is the typical way that episodic familiarity
is defined experimentally. This predicts no difference between
semantic and episodic probes, in contrast to the clear memory
effects observed. Third, connectivity between the hippocampus
and neocortex is stronger for recent episodic memory, which
is the kind primarily associated with the episodic probe, rela-
tive to remote episodic memory, which is only associated with
the semantic probe (Soderlund et al., 2012). Such differential
hippocampal-cortical linkages would predict a greater reduction
in episodic memory-related cortical activity for the episodic than
semantic probe, thereby resulting in a smaller N400 (or N2) for
the episodic than semantic probe—the opposite of the observed
pattern. Fourth, altogether, these episodic memory considera-
tions would predict a larger N400 for the irrelevants than the
episodic probe because the episodic probe was studied before-
hand but the irrelevants were not (and so are less familiar), but
no evidence was found for any difference between the episodic
probe and irrelevants. The parsimonious explanation is that the
consolidated semantic memory in the cortex for the semantic
probe drives the N400 pattern, as argued here. Consistent with
this, the FN400 has been argued to be identical to the N400 and
to reflect semantic memory and conceptual implicit memory for
repeated items (Paller et al., 2007; Voss et al., 2010; Voss and
Federmeier, 2011). Note, as all items repeated here many times,
conceptual priming (due to conceptual implicit memory) could
explain the N400 pattern, not only semantic memory (Renoult
and Debruille, 2011). The N400 shows robust modulation with
conceptual priming, being smaller for repeated than new mean-
ingful items (Paller et al., 2007). Conceptual priming would be
greater for the meaningful semantic probe than the minimally
meaningful episodic probe (Voss et al., 2010), consistent with the
observed pattern.
Together, these findings suggest that the N2 and N400, as
highly sensitive markers of knowledge and semantic memory,
respectively, could potentially be used for detecting concealed
information, but only if the type of memory is considered care-
fully and the concealed information that one is trying to detect
is stored in the brain systems for knowledge and semantic mem-
ory. In contrast, if the goal is to detect episodic memory, then
later brain potentials, like the P3b and LPC, may be more suitable
markers. Inmost realistic cases, in which the probes are associated
with both semantic and episodic memory, both types of markers
should be considered.
P3b
The main prior study that addressed an issue similar to the one
addressed here is the one by Rosenfeld and Collaborators (2006).
The relevant finding from that study is that the P3b difference
between probes and irrelevants was much smaller for low-impact
probes (the recently learned experimenter’s name) than high-
impact probes (a participant’s name). In fact, the difference
between probes and irrelevants in the low-impact condition was
close to zero. Like that study, we found that semantic probes elicit
a larger P3b than episodic ones: The CIT effect is larger in the
semantic than episodic condition. Even so, at least in the analy-
sis within a fixed P3b window, episodic probes show a sizeable
CIT effect on the P3b. One possible explanation for this dis-
crepancy is that, in the prior study, the low-impact probes were
incidentally learned, even though they were encountered numer-
ous times in the experiment. In the current study, participants
were explicitly told that the (episodic) probe was a secret date
that they had to lie about. This constitutes intentional encod-
ing, which results in greater episodic memory than incidental
encoding and likely also increases the saliency of such a date
(Hyde and Jenkins, 1973; Craik and Tulving, 1975; Kellogg et al.,
1982). Given the intentional nature of deception, intentional
study would also be expected to transfer more appropriately to
the intentional retrieval situation of the CIT paradigm than inci-
dental study (Tulving and Thomson, 1973; Morris et al., 1977).
Since the stimulus sequences used in the two memory conditions
were identical, this finding confirms that the P3b is modulated by
the type of memory triggered by the probe, not just by context
updating taking place in working memory (Johnson, 1986, 1993).
Importantly, the CIT effect on the P3b did not become smaller
with repetition, but rather, tended to become larger. This indi-
cates that the duration of the test is not a major issue in P3-based
CITs, and the benefit of longer ERP sessions with more trials may
not be cancelled by habituation effects, as usually seen with elec-
trodermal measures (Ben-Shakhar et al., 1975). Future work will
have to determine whether the CIT effect on the P3b is constant
for even longer sessions that may be required in the field. It is
noteworthy that our results may underestimate the size of the P3b
in the episodic condition during its initial phase when it overlaps
the N400 at central sites due to the opposing polarities of these
ERPs (Figures 3–5), but not afterwards around the P3b peak and
thereafter from 500 to 600ms.
The P3b pattern bolsters the interpretation of the earlier
frontal N2 and centroparietal N400 patterns in terms of knowl-
edge and semantic memory. Both the present findings and the
Rosenfeld et al. (2006) study indicate that the CIT effect on the
P3b is larger for semantic items (e.g., your own birth date and
name, respectively) relative to items that are less meaningful or
about which one has less knowledge (e.g., a secret date, irrele-
vants). Likewise, in experiments on semantic memory using an
object categorization task, a parietal P3b-like component, peak-
ing around 600ms, is more positive for objects categorized more
than less successfully (Schendan and Kutas, 2002, 2003; Schendan
and Maher, 2009). Consequently, in the present study, the P3b
is larger for the semantic than episodic probe possibly because
subjects more successfully identify the semantic probe as their
birthdate relative to the episodic probe as the secret date and dis-
criminate the semantic better than the episodic probe from the
irrelevant dates in order to generate a deceptive response; after
all, the episodic probe and the irrelevants have minimal to no
meaning and so they may be less discriminable from each other
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in terms of knowledge and semantic memory. Altogether, the N2,
N400, and P3b all point to the importance of knowledge and
semantic memory for demonstrating a CIT effect on these ERPs.
LPC
Even though previous CIT studies have considered episodic mem-
ory, no previous ERP study has examined specifically the LPC,
which is well established as a marker of conscious recollection
from episodic memory (Paller and Kutas, 1992; Rugg and Curran,
2007). In the present study, episodic probes elicit a larger LPC
than semantic ones. This finding is consistent with studies of
episodic memory in which people decide whether an item is new
or old (e.g., Paller et al., 1995). In these studies, a larger LPC is
typically found for old items recognized as such (e.g., items with
associated episodic knowledge) relative to new items. The pari-
etal distribution and time course of this old/new LPC resembles
the LPC memory effect found here. The present LPC finding thus
indicates that, when the concealed information is thought to be
primarily or predominantly due to episodic memory, then the
LPC may be the most robust ERP to examine in CIT paradigms.
Intriguingly, the LPC pattern is the only ERP finding that parallels
the RT pattern: The LPC is more positive and RTs are slower for
episodic than semantic probes, which are slower than irrelevants.
However, the LPC starts after the RTs in the episodic condition,
on average, suggesting that the recollection process underlying the
LPC cannot drive the RT effect.
Repetition
Repetition effects should be explored in future ERP work, espe-
cially given the sensitivity demonstrated here of RTs and accuracy
to this factor. Overall, RTs and ERPs between 250 and 350ms,
400 and 600ms, and 750 and 900ms show repetition effects, but
focal analyses on the N2, N400, P3b, and LPC show no repeti-
tion effects, perhaps due to insufficient power. Intriguingly, RT
repetition effects to all item types (i.e., faster responses in the sec-
ond than first half) tend to be larger (albeit non-significantly) in
the episodic than semantic condition. However, no ERP repeti-
tion effect is larger in the episodic than semantic condition, but
given the weakness of the RT interaction, power may have been
insufficient to detect this also in the ERPs. Nonetheless, it appears
that the N2 and N400 are larger for episodic than semantic in
the first (Figure 6) more than the second half of trials (Figure 7),
whereas the P3b is larger for semantic than episodic, and the
LPC is larger for episodic than semantic in the second more than
first half. Future ERP studies should manipulate repetition with
a greater number of trials and in more subtle ways and evaluate
whether repetition modulates the CIT effect on these ERPs and
if so, how.
Performance and ERPs
RTs, accuracy, and ERP effects differed from each other so
it is unclear which ERP effects drive the behavioral effects.
Nonetheless, a few points can be made. The LPC starts too late
(after 700ms) to drive RT effects (all faster than 700ms, on aver-
age) and corresponding accuracy of these responses. The P3b
(400–600ms) overlaps the earliest RTs, which are to irrelevants
(500–600ms), and so is also probably too late to influence RTs to
irrelevants and even too late to influence RTs to probes much if
at all (600–700ms). The N2 and N400 are thus the ERP markers
that are most likely to be responsible for the RTs and corre-
sponding accuracy. Consistent with this, the N2 has long been
recognized as having a time course and relationship with RTs
consistent with the underlying decision processes driving the RTs
during discrimination tasks, such as the CIT, in part because the
N2 is early enough to drive the RTs, whereas the P3 is often
too late, and N2 latency is related to RTs (Ritter et al., 1979).
Likewise, the N3 complex, which includes the (mis)match N2, is
related to RTs during category decisions (Philiastides and Sajda,
2006, 2007; Philiastides et al., 2006). Given that both the N2 and
N400 show a CIT effect in the semantic condition, the RT CIT
effect in this condition could reflect both knowledge and seman-
tic memory processes underlying these ERPs. Given that the N2
but not the N400 shows a CIT effect in both the semantic and
episodic conditions, the knowledge processes underlying the N2
but not the N400 drives the CIT effect in the episodic condition.
However, it is likely that at least the initial CIT effect on the P3b,
which starts within 400ms in the semantic condition and within
475ms in the episodic condition, could further influence the RTs.
However, the finding that P3b CIT effects end around 650ms,
which is after the response to all items except the episodic probe
in the first half of trials suggests that the processes underlying the
P3b are unlikely to be the only factor influencing behavior. This
highlights the importance of considering the (mis)match frontal
N2 and N400 and underlying knowledge and semantic memory
processes, respectively, in future CIT studies and for deception
detection, in general.
Saliency and related factors
Memories can differ in saliency, but how they differ depends
upon many factors. Manipulating these factors was beyond the
scope of this initial experiment but will be important for future
research. We highlight here a few key issues regarding saliency
and memory. First, saliency needs to be defined clearly but as
yet a good definition is lacking, in general and in the mem-
ory field. Saliency has been most clearly defined in the context
of selective attention to perceptual information. In particular,
saliency is defined operationally by search performance: Items
that differ along certain perceptual dimensions from the sur-
rounding context are more salient and can be detected faster
than items that do not differ as much from the surrounding
context (e.g., a red dot against a background of green distrac-
tor dots). Saliency so defined orients selective attention, which
can occur in parallel in early visual areas (Treisman, 2006) and,
after the initial separation of stimulus information into features,
binds these features together into an object representation and
searches a scene serially (Wolfe et al., 1989; Treisman, 2006).
Depending upon the context and task goals, these computations
can inform the selective attention system to attend to salient fea-
tures (e.g., the red dot) and filter out distractors and less salient
features (Kastner and Pinsk, 2004). Selective attention can also
be driven endogenously (e.g., by task goals and memory), and
the top-down feedback inputs that perform these functions pro-
ceed from higher to lower order areas of information processing
(Buffalo et al., 2010).
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FIGURE 6 | Grand average ERPs elicited by irrelevants (thin solid lines),
probes (thick solid lines) in the semantic (black lines) and episodic
(red lines) autobiographical conditions in the first half of trials. ERPs are
plotted between 100 and 900ms (at all scalp recording sites). ERPs are shown
negative up and referenced to the average of the left and right mastoids. A
diagram with the location of the recording sites is shown on the bottom right.
Second, in CIT paradigms usually the various items do not
differ perceptually and so “saliency” is driven entirely by stored
memory and to its interaction with the details of the CIT
paradigm. For example, probes and irrelevants are perceptually
identical between conditions (i.e., all strings of two numbers
and three letters) and have the same motor demands and so
perceptual differences cannot drive saliency here: Saliency is
determined primarily by memory. Notably, this dictates that,
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FIGURE 7 | Grand average ERPs elicited by irrelevants (thin solid lines),
probes (thick solid lines) in the semantic (black lines) and episodic (red
lines) autobiographical conditions in the second half of trials. ERPs are
plotted between 100 and 900ms (at all scalp recording sites). ERPs are shown
negative up and referenced to the average of the left and right mastoids. A
diagram with the location of the recording sites is shown on the bottom right.
because memory is stored where it is processed in the cortex
(Slotnick and Schacter, 2004; Schendan and Maher, 2009),
saliency effects might be observed at the same time as mem-
ory differences are computed and/or afterwards when an ear-
lier memory computation influences later cognitive and other
memory processes (Moses et al., 2005): Saliency effects can only
be observed once the first memory effect has begun. Thus,
it is necessary to consider how saliency has been defined in
some of the few memory studies that have tried to address
its role.
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Third, in the memory field, definitions of saliency are based
on memory representations, not perception, and differ between
memory types: the information encoded in memory and its
interactions with the task determine the salience of memory of
a particular type (e.g., semantic or episodic), and such memory
saliency computations can potentially influence another mem-
ory (of the same or a different type) activated simultaneously
or later on in stimulus processing (e.g., semantic memory could
influence episodic memory). For example, saliency of semantic
memory has been defined based on (1) conceptual or perceptual
distinctiveness in terms of dominance of meaning (e.g., for
“bank,” the dominant meaning is associated with “money,” not
“river”) (Rajaram, 1998) or learned statistical regularities of the
stimuli (e.g., orthographic frequency) (Rajaram, 1998), respec-
tively, or (2) the representation strength of semantic features (e.g.,
high visual vs. high motor) (Kellenbach et al., 2002; Koriat and
Pearlman-Avnion, 2003). (3) For episodic memory, saliency (or
significance) of autobiographical information is based on the
personal relevance of the learning episode and is closely related to
emotional salience (Westmacott and Moscovitch, 2003), and this
helps to preserve episodicmemory (Levin et al., 1985) and seman-
tic memory despite brain injury (Westmacott and Moscovitch,
2003). Note, by all these definitions, memory saliency is intrin-
sically entangled with the memory itself. On this basis, the birth
date is higher in the saliency of both semantic and episodic mem-
ory than the secret date, predicting larger CIT effects across the
entire ERP waveform. However, this was not the case because
the LPC, consistent with this ERP as an index of episodic recol-
lection, shows a larger CIT effect for the secret date. This raises
the possibility that, for episodic memory, an additional defini-
tion of saliency is based on the role of recency (Soderlund et al.,
2012). The present findings suggest that episodic memory can be
more salient when recent than remote, as the secret date was asso-
ciated with more recent episodic memory than the birth date.
Finally, these considerations and multiple memory systems the-
ory (Schacter and Tulving, 1994), more generally, highlight that
saliency can only be defined within a particular type of mem-
ory; otherwise, one would be comparing apples and oranges.
Saliency for semantic memory is not the same as saliency for
episodic memory (e.g., meaning dominance determines salience
for semantic memory vs. personal relevance determines salience
for episodic memory). Thus, it would be difficult, if not the-
oretically impossible, to compare directly the saliency of items
such as the birth and secret dates. For instance, on the one
hand, it is uncommon to ask people explicitly to lie, and so the
secret date has a very distinctive and salient episodic memory,
and the recency of this memory may also enhance its saliency.
On the other hand, the birth date usually has more person-
ally relevant associated episodic memories than the secret date,
and so it is very salient as well. In short, memory salience is
greater for the birth date based on some definitions and mem-
ory types, whereas it is greater for the secret date based on
others. Finally, we note that, by definition, semantic memory
represents meaning, whereas episodicmemory can store informa-
tion regardless of meaning, as when people recognize non-sense
visual patterns (Voss et al., 2011). Accordingly, the birth date is
highly meaningful due to activating semantic memory, whereas
the secret date is less meaningful due to activating semantic
memory less successfully but instead activates episodic mem-
ory, due to its recency, more successfully than the birth date.
Thus, as we argued, the birth and secret dates differ as a func-
tion of their ability to activate semantic or episodic memory,
and differ in meaningfulness (as one definition of saliency) only
as a function of the extent to which they activate semantic
memory.
Fourth, saliency is not a property of an item alone but rather
a property of the item in a particular context. For example, the
frequent word “table” may be low in saliency when embedded in
a list of other frequent words but highly salient in the context
of famous names. Furthermore, memory saliency depends on
the task at hand and can be modulated by attentional manip-
ulations (Rajaram, 1998), and so the word “table” can become
highly salient in the context of other common words when the
task requires detecting furniture words that appear infrequently.
In the present CIT paradigm, the birth and secret dates occurred
(in different blocks) infrequently within a stream of random
dates, and they were the only items for which a lie had to be
produced, making them highly salient in both conditions. The
behavioral results support this and provide an operational def-
inition of saliency for this task, as done in the attention field:
faster RTs to probes are taken to reflect higher saliency in the
task. Specifically, although RTs differ reliably between probes and
irrelevants (documenting that the study had sufficient power to
detect such differences), the memory conditions show no evi-
dence of any difference that could be attributed to saliency.
Thus, the CIT paradigm and procedures made both types of
probes highly salient (being the only items for which a lie had
to be produced) so that any residual saliency differences are
very small; at most, probes show a non-significant trend to
be faster in the semantic than episodic condition in the first
block (596 vs. 640ms). This could be due to the specific con-
tent of the memory (birthdate) or to the fact that the semantic
probes were the only ones with a strong semantic content in
the stream of irrelevants and targets (items with predominantly
episodic memory associated with them and minimal semantic
memory).
Finally, other reasons why we believe differential saliency was
not an issue in the present study include the following. (1) If the
birth date is more salient than the secret date, then a saliency-
based account of the frontal N2 would predict a larger N2 to
probes than irrelevants and a larger N2 for the birth than secret
date. This is because, by definition, saliency engages attentional
and other cognitive control processes (e.g., response monitoring,
depending on the stimulus-response mapping) and these pro-
cesses are typically associated with a larger N2 (Folstein and Van
Petten, 2008). So, counterfactually, a smaller N2 for the date of
birth than the secret date implies that date of birth was not more
salient than the secret date. The same logic applies to the com-
parison between probes and irrelevants. Thus, the evidence is
at odds with a saliency account and more in tune with a mem-
ory matching explanation. (2) Further, the LPC effect should be
larger for the birth than the secret date, but the opposite was
found, consistent with the idea that memory differences pri-
marily drive the effects. (3) To our knowledge, there has been
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no systematic P300 CIT work suggesting that a recent memory
leads to smaller P300s than one’s birth date, unless such infor-
mation is acquired incidentally (Rosenfeld et al., 2006), which
was not the case in our study, and no CIT studies have been
conducted in which stimulus saliency was non-circularly defined
and its systematic manipulation affected P300 amplitude (or
any other ERP) in a way that could easily explain the current
findings.
Memory task orientation
Memory is task-dependent; task instructions can influence the
importance of a particular type of memory for performance and
alter the pattern of effects (Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork, 1988).
Thus differential activation of semantic and episodic memory by
the birth and secret dates may also change the memory orien-
tation of the CIT task to favor semantic vs. episodic memory,
respectively. Consider that a seemingly subtle difference in task
instructions from categorization (e.g., categorize the object) to
recognition (e.g., recognize the item as old or new) alters the cor-
tical networks involved in processing the same item (Schendan
and Stern, 2008), consistent with multiple memory system the-
ory (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991; Schacter and Tulving, 1994).
In the SAM condition, the task requirement to lie about the
birthdate likely focuses attention on associated rich semantic
memory and remote episodic memories because these memo-
ries distinguish the birth date from the target date and irrel-
evants. Likewise, in the EAM condition, the task requirement
to lie about the secret date should instead focus attention on
the one recent episodic memory to cue the task response, while
also minimizing attention to any associated semantic memory
or knowledge, because recent episodic memory most clearly dis-
tinguishes the secret date from the target date and irrelevants.
Moreover, the EAM condition probably focuses attention on
episodic memory more than the SAM condition because strate-
gic retrieval processes in inferior prefrontal cortex are required
more for remote than recent episodic recollection (Soderlund
et al., 2012), and lying recruits such prefrontal processes to inhibit
the prepotent truthful response. Altogether, this would make
these neural resources less available to recollect episodic autobi-
ographical memories, which is more of a problem for the birth
date in the SAM condition where in these memories are more
remote, than the EAM condition where in the memory is recent.
Likewise, such prefrontal processes are also implicated in select-
ing episodic memory from competing alternatives (Badre and
Wagner, 2007), and the many remote episodic memories asso-
ciated with the birthdate would require such selection processes
more than the single recent episodic memory associated with
the secret date. Consequently, the SAM condition orients the
task predominantly toward using semantic memory as the pri-
mary cue to guide performance because semantic memory is
retrieved more readily than is remote episodic memory. In con-
trast, the EAM condition orients the task predominantly toward
recent episodic memory as the primary cue to guide perfor-
mance. This predicts that the SAM condition should produce
larger CIT effects on ERP components related to knowledge and
semantic memory (i.e., N2, N400, and P3b), whereas the EAM
condition should produce larger CIT effects on ERP components
related to episodic memory (i.e., LPC), consistent with these
findings. Such task orientation effects would then interact with
the memory retrieved to determine task performance (Schyns,
1998).
CONCLUSIONS
This study demonstrates that memory associated with a probe has
multiple effects on the ERPs in CIT paradigms (N2, N400, P3b,
and LPC), and the exact pattern of each effect depends upon the
type of memory. Here, these effects are broadly consistent with
the known properties of semantic and episodic memory systems,
as assessed using ERPs. Documenting and examining these ERP
effects is necessary to understand fully the neural basis of the pro-
cesses engaged during CIT and related paradigms. For practical
applications, analysis methods may be fine-tuned to detect con-
cealed information depending on the associated memory type:
For semantic probes, the focus should be the frontal N2, cen-
troparietal N400, and parietal P3b, and for episodic probes the
focus should be the P3b, and the LPC. Further, using longer
sessions with more trials can efficiently improve signal-to-noise
ratio because ERP CIT effects exhibited no signs of habituation
or fatigue.
Altogether, the findings indicate that the frontal N2, cen-
troparietal N400, and P3b are especially sensitive to information
stored in knowledge and semantic memory systems of the neo-
cortex, whereas the LPC is especially sensitive to information
stored in the episodic memory system that depends on the hip-
pocampus and adjacent cortical structures of the mediotemporal
lobe. This conclusion highlights that clearly defining, manipulat-
ing, and considering the type of memory that may be concealed
may be important for accurate detection of concealed infor-
mation. Future CIT studies will need to consider carefully the
semantic and episodic memory associated with each item, as
well as how this interacts with task and experimental context.
For example, if the goal is to reveal concealed episodic mem-
ory, then the semantic memory associated with each episodic
item may need to be equated or specifically manipulated to sepa-
rate out the semantic from episodic contributions. The present
memory manipulation essentially orients subjects to focus on
one memory system over another because the semantic and
episodic probes that determined the memory system (i.e., seman-
tic vs. episodic) for retrieval were presented in separate blocks of
trials; participants did not have to discriminate between seman-
tic and episodic probes directly. The strength of this approach
is that it parallels the methods of memory research. Semantic
memory experiments would involve asking subjects to report
if the item exists in the real world, the meaning of a stim-
ulus, or to categorize or name it, and items would differ in
how well they are known (i.e., how well semantic memory is
activated), akin to the semantic probe and irrelevants in this
CIT paradigm. Episodic memory experiments would involve
asking subjects to report whether the item is familiar from a
prior study experience and/or to recollect associated informa-
tion from that study experience, and familiar items would be
mixed with unfamiliar items that had not been studied, akin
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to the episodic probe and irrelevants in this CIT paradigm. The
present experiment was a first attempt at teasing apart semantic
and episodic memory contributions to the CIT. However, here,
as in the real world, items will usually activate both semantic and
episodic memory to some extent. This mix needs to be carefully
documented in CIT paradigms and, more broadly, in deception
research.
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